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Since 1994, oceans of ink have dried on forestsof pulped trees in the quest to understandSouth Africa’s crime problem and develop
workable solutions to it. Government departments
have produced White Paper after Green, strategies
beyond number, commitments to act and press
statements by turn self-congratulatory and self-
exculpatory; academics and NGO researchers have
produced surveys and evaluations on everything
from criminality in schools to conditions in South
Africa’s prisons; journalists and editors have
emblazoned our papers and streetlights with stories
of horror and pleas for action and accountability.
As a country, we are not short of things to say about
crime.
And yet, despite the all-consuming attention crime
has enjoyed, the deterioration in the crime situation
over the past few years suggests that we may be in
one of two positions. The first is that we know far
too little about the causes of our crime problem and
what we must do to stop it. The second is that we
do know the answers to these questions but we can
do nothing with that knowledge because either the
problems are too intractable or the solutions are
beyond our means and ability.
These are not happy alternatives, but of the two, it
would be distinctly preferable to have failed to
understand our crime problem adequately and/or to
have failed to prescribe the correct remedies. This
would put us in a far better position than if we
understood the problem but found that we could
not solve it. 
It would require a brave (or dishonest) analyst to
assert definitively which of these conditions best
describes our situation. Nevertheless, perhaps
because the alternative may be too grim to
contemplate, it is the view of this writer that,
though our social and criminal problems are
serious, and that some may actually be intractable,
it is our analysis about crime that has been
deficient and that changes to policy and strategy
could make a significant difference to South African
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crime rates. Most importantly, it is entirely possible
to implement these changes. Adopting them,
however, would require the serious rethinking of
some of the most closely held convictions of many
in the crime-and-policing policy community.
Where we went wrong
Perhaps the simplest way to demonstrate the way
in which South African criminal justice policy has
erred, is to reflect that between 1994 and 2007,
the number of convicts in South Africa’s prisons
rose by 26%, from 90 000 to 113 000. Over the
same period, however, the number of convicts in
Britain’s prisons rose by nearly 85%, from 35 800
to 66 000. In the United States, the rate of increase
has been about 55%, from 1.5 million to about 2.3
million. In the previous decade-and-a-half,
however, the number of convicts serving time in
the US had tripled. 
Naturally, the fact that one or other country
doubles the number of prisoners over a certain
period does not mean that that is the most
appropriate example to follow. However, given
that levels of violent crime in South Africa are
much higher than Britain’s, it is striking that the
number of British convicts has grown three-and-a-
half times faster over the past decade than their
South African counterparts. 
There are many reasons why South Africa has not
locked away as many violent criminals as we
might have. The criminal justice system inherited
from apartheid lacked legitimacy and, therefore,
struggled to obtain the kind of co-operation from
victims and witnesses that is needed to prosecute
cases successfully in court. We also inherited a
justice system unduly wedded to the use of
reverse-onus provisions and confessions to secure
convictions. When the legal principles on which
these were built were deemed unconstitutional in
the mid-1990s, the transition to a system that
bases its cases on a different logic proved more
difficult than anticipated. The criminal justice
system, like other institutions in our society, has
also had to endure wrenching organisational
change – the amalgamation of 11 police agencies,
for instance – combined with a fraught process of
transformation. 
Jointly and separately, these factors would have
made the rapid improvement of conviction rates
difficult to achieve, but their impact was worsened
by a crucial intellectual and conceptual misstep
made by all the most important policy-makers,
academics and NGOs in the mid-1990s – one that
has been repeated ever since. This was the
commitment we all displayed to seeing the role of
the criminal justice system, first and foremost, as
being about preventing crime, with the idea of
‘crime prevention’ understood in a very direct and
literal way.
This article will put forward three main reasons why
the criminal justice policy-making community has
been in thrall of the idea of crime prevention. The
first of these is what might be called the politics or,
even, the aesthetics of crime prevention.
As a culture, much of our common sense dictates
that we think of prevention more favourably than its
alternative. Prevention, we are taught, is better than
cure. A stitch in time, so it is said, saves nine. 
There is nothing wrong with these sentiments, and it
would be wrong to say that our criminal justice
policies have been built on the insubstantial
foundations that these bits of folk wisdom reflect.
Still, there is something of this sentiment in the
background of many discussions about crime and
justice. This is also, however, a sentiment that has
been immeasurably strengthened by the basic tenor
of South Africa’s politics across all political parties.
This holds – correctly and indisputably – that we
have a history in which immense damage was done
to individuals, families and communities, and
locates the causes of our crime problem in the
socio-economic and institutional debris bequeathed
us by Apartheid. If we are to get on top of crime,
therefore, we must deal with the myriad of social
problems that cause it; to do otherwise would be to
add insult to socio-economic injury.
If the basic politics underpinning South Africa’s
understanding of itself is one reason we embraced
the idea of crime prevention, another related reason
is that, for obvious reasons, policing and law
enforcement did not have much legitimacy in the
immediate aftermath of Apartheid. These
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institutions, after all, had been purpose built for
protecting the Apartheid regime, and they had used
all their legal – and some not-so-legal – powers to
that end. Little wonder, then, that one of the abiding
responses to many in the policy-making community
was that South Africa had seen its fill of hard
policing, and that something more palatable was in
order.
In relation to policing, then, our most basic
sentiments in the mid-1990s were that finding an
alternative to aggressive arrest-and-imprisonment
policing was a national priority. A second, more
important reason why our criminal justice system
embraced the idea of crime prevention, however,
was that this is precisely what the leadership of the
SAPS wanted.
For policing, one of the most profound institutional
consequences of the death of Apartheid was that
the security branch of the South African Police, long
the most powerful branch of the police, went the
same way as constitutional disenfranchisement and
statutory racism. As this institution was dismantled,
people who came out of the uniformed branches
quickly filled the vacuum created at the top of the
police organisation. The uniformed branch, as
opposed to the detective services, understands
policing as being primarily directed at the
prevention of crime. It is, in the language of the
SAPS, the seat of ‘proactive’ as opposed to ‘reactive’
policing. 
It is no coincidence, of course, that a government
whose instincts tended towards crime prevention
would select a leadership core for the new SAPS
from the ranks of that part of policing with most
affinity for the programme. What is important,
however, is that a shared commitment developed
between government policy-makers and police
leadership  to devoting the resources of the SAPS to
preventing crime, and it is this that set us on our
present path. 
These two reasons – the instincts and politics of
government and the organisational dynamics of
changing police leadership – were only part of the
story, however. By far the most important reason
why both government and senior police officers
embraced a vision of policing which was focused
on preventing crime, was that everyone who was
reading the international literature at the time would
have believed that this approach was the last, best
hope for policing.
How we were misled by international experience
Anyone who was paying attention to the
criminology journals and police science books
written in the early- and mid-1990s would have
been forgiven for thinking that the traditional model
of policing was being written off as a failure.
Dubbed, somewhat sneeringly, the ‘professional
model of policing’, it was seen as having failed the
societies in which it was most strongly entrenched.
That failure was measured by the extraordinary rise
in crime that countries in the developed world –
most importantly, the United States – had
experienced in the 1980s and early 1990s, and had
led to the demand for new thinking about policing.
In essence, this came in two varieties: on the one
side, conservative thinkers punted what came to be
called variously ‘zero-tolerance policing’ or ‘broken
windows policing’; on the other, liberal and left-
leaning theorists and policy-makers staked their
names to some version of ‘community policing’ or
‘problem-solving policing’ or some other variation
on the theme.
To be sure, there is much that separates zero-
tolerance policing and community policing, with
the former imagining steely-faced centurions
policing a city’s streets for even the most minor
infraction, and the latter focusing on what might be
called the tactics of ‘armed social work’ –
community engagement, partnership building, and
the like. Different as these two approaches are,
however, they also share an important commonality:
a conviction that policing, done in the right way,
can reduce crime directly. For both schools, crime
prevention is the chief aim and object of the police.
As importantly, for both, that goal is achievable.
These, then, are the reasons why we have adopted
the prevention of crime as the lodestar of criminal
justice in South Africa: our politics, the views of
police leadership, and the conviction, prevalent
among criminologists at the crucial times during the
development of our new policies, that crime
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prevention, understood as being different from, and,
in some ways, opposed to, law enforcement, was
the way of the future.
The fact is that, whether policing for crime
prevention had any prospect of success elsewhere
in the world, the UK and US governments were not
so convinced of the likely success of the new
approaches that they stopped building prisons. In
South Africa, by contrast, we have allowed our
criminal justice system – the institutions involved in
investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating and
incarcerating offenders – to stagnate and even to
degrade. This has been a fundamental, if still
rectifiable, mistake.
How failing to build the criminal justice system has
stimulated criminality
It is one thing to argue that we have adopted a
poorly conceived macro-strategy and another to
claim that any plausible alternative would have
done any better. It may be, after all, that the
problem is not our ability to understand the causes
of crime or to implement appropriate solutions, but
that our social problems are thoroughly intractable.
If that is the case, then no criminal justice strategy
could fundamentally affect  the levels of crime in
South Africa. 
If it were literally true that the peculiar social,
cultural, economic and historical forces operating in
South African society were the cause of our high
crime rate, this would certainly be a possibility. It
may be, however, that this is not the case, and that
the decision to focus criminal justice attention on
the prevention of crime rather than on the arrest,
prosecution and incarceration of offenders has itself
helped to shape the way the crime wave has
developed in post-liberation South Africa. In this
regard, it is worth asking if the failure to incarcerate
sufficiently large numbers of people involved in
violent crime is itself a factor in explaining the
prevalence of violent crime in South Africa – and
the view taken by this researcher is that it must have
done.
In this regard, consider the findings of a recently
published study into the way obesity spreads
through a population. Tracking the movements of
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over 12 000 people over 32 years, the authors
found that there were very strong, statistically
highly significant correlations between one person’s
gaining weight and weight gains for their friends
and relatives. They found that:
[A] person’s chances of becoming obese
increased by 57%  if he or she had a friend
who became obese; … [that a]mong pairs of
adult siblings, if one sibling became obese,
the chance that the other would become
obese increased by 40%; … [that i]f one
spouse became obese, the likelihood that
the other spouse would become obese
increased by 37%; … [and that p]ersons of
the same sex had relatively greater influence
on each other than those of the opposite
sex. (Christakis and Fowler 2007: 370) 
Trying to explain this, the authors posit a
mechanism that could tell us something important
about how criminality might have spread through
our population: 
To the extent that obesity is a product of
voluntary choices or behaviours, the fact
that people are embedded in social
networks and are influenced by the evident
appearance and behaviours of those around
them, suggests that weight gain in one
person might influence weight gain in
others. Having obese social contacts might
change a person’s tolerance for being obese
or might influence his or her adoption of
specific behaviours (e.g., smoking, eating,
and exercising). (Christakis and Fowler
2007: 371)
If we change the language of this quote to make it
refer to the question of crime and criminality in
South Africa, we might arguably learn something
about how the failure to arrest and incarcerate
sufficiently large numbers of people engaged in acts
of violent crime might have had the effect of
encouraging the criminality of others. It may be, in
other words, that while our socio-economic
conditions have been pushing people into crime,
the sheer prevalence of this kind of behaviour, and
the sheer number of people involved, has had the
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equally damaging effect of pulling many other
people into it, too. If that is so, the focus on crime
prevention, because it has failed and because it has
distracted us from the challenge of building a
criminal justice system that can identify (swiftly), try
(fairly) and incarcerate (humanely) much larger
numbers of people who commit violent crimes, is
an important reason why crime rates in South Africa
are so high.
Drawing attention away from the difficult and,
potentially, morally fraught business of catching and
incarcerating violent offenders has been manifest in
a number of ways. By far the most prominent of
these has been the failure to build sufficient prison
accommodation – which has grown at a pace no
faster than the growth rate of the South African
population as a whole – and the failure to invest
adequately in the building of the Detective Service,
prosecution service and magistracy. Indeed, in the
case of the Detective Service, some organisational
policies adopted in the police since the mid-1990s
may have been purpose-built to undermine the
status and morale of detectives, making it far harder
to recruit and retain talented personnel. Together
with the failure to address weaknesses in the courts
and the lack of prison accommodation, this means
that our conviction rates are simply too low, and
the flow of convicts into our prisons is too slow.
By most standards, of course, South Africa is a
society with a very large prisoner population.
Certainly, this is so in per capita terms, where our
imprisonment numbers are among the highest on
the planet. This, many have suggested, implies that
the increased use of prison is not the answer we
need. Perhaps this is true. Perhaps sending large
numbers of people to prison will not make all that
much difference to crime rates, or will do so only
very slowly. These are real possibilities. By the same
token, however, the fact is that, measured in
relation to our murder rates, South Africa’s prisoner
population is not large at all. In fact, one
compilation of the relevant statistics – always
bearing in mind the enormous difficulties of making
cross-country comparisons – implies that our
prisoner-per-murder figure is among the lowest in
the world. If that is true, then we may not have
used prison anywhere near as gratuitously as some
have suggested, and may not have generated a
prisoner population large enough to begin to roll
back the crime wave.
Conclusion
The upshot of all this is that South Africa needs to
rethink some of its basic concepts of criminal
justice. It may be true that our history and our social
conditions are uniquely poised to produce crime,
but if criminal behaviour is in some sense
contagious – that it is ‘caught’ by non-criminals
from contact with criminals in the same way that
obesity seems to spread through a population – then
we need to look as closely at our ability to
quarantine the infected. By all means we should
continue to work on addressing the root causes of
crime, but we should resist the hubristic notion that
we will crack these problems quickly or easily. If we
have learnt anything from the past 13 years, it
should be this.
If we are to address crime seriously, we need a
serious programme that will build a criminal justice
system that can double the number of convicts
behind bars over the next ten years, focusing
particularly on violent offenders, while at the same
time maintaining a commitment to the due process
rights of the Constitution and our criminal law. This
will not be easy, not least because building a decent
and effective justice system may be the work of
generations. Having said that, there are two reasons
for optimism. The first is that it seems that, however
moderate the success of the SAPS at solving the vast
majority of crimes committed, when a high-profile
outrage occurs, it is often (if not usually) able to
secure arrests. This suggests that the basic
infrastructure of technical skills and competencies
on which an efficient and effective Detective
Service could be built, exists. 
The second reason for optimism is that the SAPS, as
opposed to most police services in the developing
world, has a degree of professionalism which might
be another crucial ingredient in any attempt to build
such a service. All is not as it should be, to be sure,
but, when compared to the corruption and
incompetence of many a developing world police
force, the SAPS stands out as exceptional. This, too,
makes it possible to imagine successfully building
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 21 • SEPTEMBER 200732 ALTBEKER
the capacity to take sufficient numbers of violent
criminals off the streets and in so doing to begin to
roll back the crime wave.
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Endnote
1 This piece draws on research conducted for, and 
arguments made in Antony Altbeker’s book, A Country
at War with Itself: South Africa’s crisis of crime.
